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International "Fugitive Snatching" in
U.S. Law: Two Views from
Opposite Ends of the Eighties
Introduction
When Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid escaped to South America,
they relied on the reluctance of the United States to violate "customary"
international law. 1 Pursuing the pair into Bolivia to bring them back to
justice in the United States, without the consent of the Bolivian govern-
ment, would have violated the rule that sovereign nations are afforded
complete and exclusive control over their territory. 2 The United States
can exercise legal authority in a foreign country, according to interna-
tional law, only to the extent that the foreign country consents to such
an exercise of authority.3 Thus, if U.S. officials entered Bolivia without
permission and undertook to arrest a pair of fugitives, Bolivia's sover-
eignty would be breached.
4
Upholding the sovereignty of Bolivia, or of any other country, nec-
essarily limits that of the United States. Sovereignty constrains law
enforcement because fugitives can escape the grasp of a pursuing
authority simply by fleeing beyond that authority's territorial jurisdic-
tion and into the jurisdiction of another sovereign.5 Legally, the pursu-
ing country must secure the cooperation of the "asylum" authority,
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]:
Sources of International Law (1) A rule of international law is one that has
been accepted as such by the international community of states
(a) in the form of customary law;
(2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent prac-
tice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.
2. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 432, comment b. See also United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277 (2d Cir. 1974).
3. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at §§ 432(2), 433(1).
4. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 432, comment b.
5. See Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (Nov. 8, 1989) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advi-
sor, U.S. Dep't of State), (available from U.S. Dept. of State pending publication of
hearing) [hereinafter statement of Abraham D. Sofaer].
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informally or through extradition, to capture the fugitive.6
States have devised ways of getting around this rule while purport-
ing to respect it. 7 The United States is no exception. On the one hand,
the United States believes that "fugitive snatching" violates customary
international law, and, because customary international law is part of the
law of the United States, fugitive snatching violates U.S. law.9 On the
other hand, while fugitive snatching is illegal, putting the fugitive on
trial after he or she has been snatched is not. Under the venerable Ker-
Frisbie doctrine,' 0 a court will not inquire into how a defendant was
brought within its jurisdiction. Barring cruel or outrageous treatment,
abducting the defendant in violation of international law does not divest
the court ofjurisdiction. 11 Thus, while abduction of fugitives by pursu-
ing authorities is illegal and can lead to criminal and civil liability for the
abductors, 12 it does not impair the court's jurisdiction over the
abducted fugitive.
A March 1980 opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel of the justice
Department (the "1980 Opinion") illustrates the inherent contradiction
in this state of affairs. Is Examining the legal and political consequences
6. Id. "States have sought to overcome the limitations on international law
enforcement activities arising from the principle of territorial integrity by cooperat-
ing in dealing with extraterritorial crime and in apprehending fugitives." Id.
7. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 432, reporter's note 2.
8. "Fugitive snatching" is used in this Note as a convenient way to refer to the
abduction of a fugitive or suspect by the nation in which that person is wanted, from
the territory of another nation in which the fugitive is found, without the latter
nation's consent. See Ostrow, F.B.I. Gets O.K. For Arrests Overseas, L.A. Times, Oct. 13,
1989, at Al, col. 5.
9. See infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
10. In Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), the Supreme Court held that a defend-
ant who was forcibly abducted from Peru and returned to the United States for trial
in state court could not challenge his indictment or conviction on the ground that he
was improperly brought within the jurisdiction of the court. In Frisbie v. Collins, 342
U.S. 519 (1952), a case of alleged interstate abduction, the Court reaffirmed Ker v.
Illinois and announced what became an oft-quoted formulation of the rule:
[D]ue process of law is satisfied when one present in Court is convicted of
crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a
fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is
nothing in the Constitution that requires a Court to permit a guilty person
rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against
his will.
Id. at 522. Thus, neither the violation of international law nor the fact of abduction
gives the defendant due process claims against the exercise of a court's jurisdiction
once he is brought within it.
11. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 433(2). An abducted fugitive may be prose-
cuted in the United States "unless his apprehension or delivery was carried out in
such reprehensible manner as to shock the conscience of civilized society." Id. The
qualification that jurisdiction may be defeated by prosecutorial conduct that shocks
the conscience is based on due process analysis in United States v. Toscanino, 500
F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974), which in turn relied on Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952).
12. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 444.
13. 4B Op. Off. Legal CounselJust. Dep't 343 (Mar. 31, 1980) [hereinafter 1980
Opinion].
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of a proposed fugitive abduction scheme, the opinion conceded that
under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine a court will maintain jurisdiction over a
defendant brought before it in violation of international law.1 4 The
opinion concluded, however, that the United States in general, and the
FBI in particular, do not have authority to abduct fugitives from foreign
countries.' 5 Thus, although it is illegal for official U.S. agents to abduct
fugitives, the court's power to try such fugitives is unaffected.
Nine years later, in aJune 21, 1989, opinion (the "1989 Opinion"),
the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel advised the Attorney
General that the FBI is authorized to abduct fugitives without the con-
sent of the nation in which the fugitive is found.' 6 The 1989 Opinion
reversed the 1980 Opinion which held that "nonconsensual extraterrito-
rial arrests"' 7 exceed the FBI's authority under domestic law.
The furor' 8 caused by this clash of views is curious in light of the
general agreement between the two opinions on the continued viability
of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.' 9 Because both opinions agreed that "fugi-
tive snatching" should not affect a court's jurisdiction over the defend-
ant, the disagreement between them concerns only the civil liability of
the U.S. government and its agents for wrongs committed in kidnapping
the fugitive. Considering the other risks involved in fugitive snatching,
the attention paid to the civil liability issue seems disproportionately
great. However, because civil liability hinges on the question of whether
the FBI is authorized under U.S. law to carry out non-consensual extra-
territorial arrests,20 the issue assumes a symbolic importance that far
14. Id. at 544, 547. The Opinion raised serious concerns about the continued
viability of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in the Second Circuit, however. See infra notes 35-
59 and accompanying text.
15. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13,.at 551-53. See infra notes 68-89 and accompany-
ing text.
16. The Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department will not release the
opinion, claiming that it is protected by an attorney-client privilege between the
Office of Legal Counsel and its "client," the Attorney General. News of the existence
of the opinion was leaked to the Los Angeles Times. See Ostrow, supra note 8. Subse-
quent publicity and controversy led to a hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee on November 8, 1989
(currently unpublished). The description of the 1989 Opinion in this Note is taken
largely from the statement prepared by Assistant Attorney General William P. Barr
for that hearing and from his testimony in answer to questions from subcommittee
members. Mr. Barr is head of the Office of Legal Counsel of theJustice Department.
As of this writing, the opinion has been requested under the Freedom of Information
Act by a number of reporters. The House Subcommittee has not used its subpoena
power to obtain the opinion.
17. The term "non-consensual extraterritorial arrests" is taken from the title of
the Statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, supra note 5. It is used interchangeably in this
Note with "fugitive snatching."
18. See Ostrow, supra note 8; U.S. Cites Right To Seize Fugitives Abroad, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 14, 1989, at 1:6, col. 4; Wall St.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
19. See Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on theJudiciary,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (Nov. 8, 1980) (statement of William P. Barr, Asst. Att'y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't ofJustice) (available from U.S. Dep't ofJustice
pending publication of hearing) [hereinafter Statement of William P. Barr].
20. See infra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
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exceeds its practical implications. The question is not just one of civil
liability for the United States and its agents, but also whether the United
States claims the power "legally" to violate international law. This
assertion by the United States significantly affects foreign perceptions of
U.S. actions, as well as Americans' perception of the proper role of their
country in international affairs.
This Note concludes that the 1989 Opinion was correct, as a matter
of U.S. law, in finding that the President and high level officials have
independent authority to order the apprehension and abduction of fugi-
tives in violation of international law. 2 1 The timing and circumstances
of the 1989 Opinion suggest that the United States may be more willing
than it was in the past to utilize this "self-help measure." 2 2 Moreover,
the 1989 Opinion reveals a willingness to combine the President's pow-
ers as chief law enforcement officer and commander-in-chief, two of his
most autonomous and potent roles, thereby putting his actions even fur-
ther beyond the scrutiny of Congress and the courts.
This Note examines and critiques the legal reasoning by which the
two Justice Department opinions reached diametrically opposite conclu-
sions regarding the authority of executive agents to conduct nonconsen-
sual extraterritorial arrests. The first and second sections summarize
the background, reasoning and conclusions of the 1980 and 1989 opin-
ions respectively. 23 The third section analyzes and critiques the two
opinions in light of relevant legal doctrines. 2 4 The final section consid-
ers the political importance and consequences of the 1989 Opinion.2 5
I. The 1980 Opinion
A. Background
On March 31, 1980, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Depart-
ment issued a Memorandum Opinion on "Extraterritorial Apprehension
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation."-26 The Attorney General
requested the opinion to assess the implications of a proposed FBI oper-
ation to abduct "fugitive financier" Robert Vesco, then residing in the
Bahamas. 2 7 U.S. agents planned to enter the Bahamas, forcibly appre-
hend Vesco, and return with him to the United States.28 Assistant
Attorney General John M. Harmon, author of the opinion, was directed
to assume that the Bahamian government would formally protest the
operation, but that local police would provide "physical surveillance and
21. See infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 297-315 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 26-140 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 141-296 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 297-315 and accompanying text.
26. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 543.
27. Ostrow, supra note 8. Vesco was indicted for securities fraud and campaign
finance violations.
28. Id. See also 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 543.
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aid in the neutralization of bodyguards during the actual
apprehension. '" 29
B. Overview of 1980 Opinion
The opinion examined four major consequences, both legal and polit-
ical, which could be expected to result from the operation. First, it
assessed the impact of the operation on the criminal prosecution of the
defendant in the United States.3 0 Second, it reviewed the international
implications of the operation. 3 ' Third, it considered the civil liability of
the United States and its agents for various torts committed in the
abduction.3 2 Finally, it assessed the criminal liability of U.S. agents who
carried out the operation.3 3 After considering all of these factors, the
opinion recommended that the FBI not attempt the proposed operation
without the consent of the asylum state, the Bahamas.3 4
C. Reasoning of the 1980 Opinion
1. Implications for Criminal Prosecution of Defendant
Assistant Attorney General Harmon began his examination of the crimi-
nal jurisdiction issue by noting that the manner in which a defendant is
brought within the jurisdiction of a court does not ordinarily diminish
the court's power over the defendant.3 5 This rule, the Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine, originated in 188636 and had been recently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh.3 7 Before it was reaffirmed, however,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit raised serious questions
about the doctrine's viability.3 8 Assistant Attorney General Harmon
believed that some of those questions remained, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's subsequent reaffirmation of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in
Gerstein.39 Because Vesco was indicted in the Second Circuit and would
be tried there, the law in that jurisdiction was important to the goals of
the 1980 Opinion. 40
The 1980 Opinion noted that in United States v. Toscanino,4 ' the Sec-
ond Circuit opened two avenues of attack on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
4 2
29. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 543.
30. Id at 544-47.
31. Id. at 547-49.
32. Id. at 549-56.
33. Id. at 556.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 544 n.1 and accompanying text (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519,
522 (1952)).
36. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
37. 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975).
38. United States v. Toscanio, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
39. See 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 544.
40. Id at 544, 547.
41. 500 F.2d 267.
42. The defendant in Toscanino alleged that he was kidnapped from Uruguay by
U.S. agents, brought to Brazil where he was tortured and interrogated for an
extended period, and then put on a commercial flight to the United States where he
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First, the court held that the doctrine was inconsistent with modem
notions of due process.43 The Second Circuit examined the develop-
ment of due process law and concluded that "a court must now 'divest
itself of jurisdiction over the person where it has been acquired as a
result of the Government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable
invasion of the accused's constitutional rights.' "44 If Toscanino's alle-
gations of kidnapping and torture proved true, the court held, due pro-
cess violations inhered not only in the alleged brutality of the arrest, but
also in the violations of international law involved in the abduction. 4 5
Analogizing from the rule which excludes illegally seized evidence from
trial, the court reasoned that freeing the defendant would deny the gov-
ernment the fruits of its misconduct and would deter illegal behavior by
police and prosecutors.46
The second avenue of attack against the Ker-Frisbie doctrine did not
depend upon constitutional issues. The Second Circuit held that it
could rely on its "supervisory power over the administration of criminal
justice in the district courts" to dismiss the case against the defendant.4 7
Dismissal would be warranted "to prevent the district courts from
becoming 'accomplices in wilful disobedience of law.' "48 Toscanino thus
held that dismissal may be warranted in fugitive snatching cases, either
as a requirement of due process, or as a discretionary tool to prevent
district courts from aiding in government misconduct.
Assistant Attorney General Harmon next analyzed the Second Cir-
cuit's application of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Gengler.4 9 In Lujan, the Second Circuit narrowed the grounds on which
forcibly abducted defendants might rely in raising due process defenses
against the court's jurisdiction. 50 Only the kind of treatment that
"shocks the conscience," as alleged in Toscanino, gives rise to due pro-
cess arguments for dismissal.5 ' The court in Lujan concluded that the
was arrested. Id. at 268-71. Neither the Uruguayan nor Brazilian government pro-
tested the alleged abduction to the U.S. The Second Circuit remanded the case for a
determination of the truth of these allegations, including the extent of the involve-
ment of U.S. officials. Id. at 281. On remand, the District Court found that the alle-
gations had no basis in fact. United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
43. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 274.
44. Id. at 275.
45. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 545 (citing Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275-76 (gov-
ernment misconduct included violation of international legal obligations)).
46. 500 F.2d at 275.
47. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 545 n.4 (citing Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276).
48. 500 F.2d at 276.
49. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
50. In Lujan, the defendant alleged that he was lured under false pretenses from
Argentina to Bolivia where he was arrested by Bolivian police allegedly in the employ
of the United States. Bolivian police and U.S. agents then took him to the airport
and put him on a flight for New York, where he was arrested by federal authorities at
the airport. 510 F.2d at 63. Neither the Argentine nor Bolivian governments pro-
tested the alleged abduction to the U.S.
51. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 65.
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defendant did not make such allegations. 52
In the 1980 Opinion, Assistant Attorney General Harmon found the
dicta in Lujan regarding international law more significant than the
court's narrowing of Toscanino's due process holding. In dicta, the Lujan
court reserved the question of whether a violation of international law
might require dismissal of the indictment.53 It was unnecessary for the
court to decide this question in Lujan because the abduction did not vio-
late international law.5 4
Thus, according to Harmon, Toscanino and Lujan left open the possi-
bility that a Second Circuit court would dismiss the case where the
defendant was brought before the court in violation of international
law.55 Gerstein v. Pugh reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, but only with
respect to due process arguments against invalid interstate arrests in the
United States.5 6 In the Second Circuit, according to Harmon, a defend-
ant may still argue that an arrest in violation of international law justifies
dismissal of the indictment, either to vindicate the defendant's due pro-
cess rights or to prevent the government from using district courts to
assist official misconduct. 57 Thus, it was necessary to determine
whether the operation violated international law to assess the "litigation
risks" involved in prosecuting the defendant in the Second Circuit.58 If
Vesco's abduction from the Bahamas violated international law, the trial
court might dismiss the case against him, pursuant to Toscanino and
Lujan.5 9
52. Id- at 66.
53. Id. at 68. In characterizing Lujan, the 1980 Opinion noted that prosecutorial
violation of international law may require dismissal of the indictment "either because
such illegal government conduct constitutes a violation of due process or because a
federal court should, as a matter of judicial administration, refuse to be a party to
official misconduct." 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 545 (citing Lujan, 510 F.2d at
68). In fact, the Lujan court did not specify why a violation of international law war-
ranted dismissal of the indictment. The 1980 Opinion seems to have inferred the
due process and supervisory powers rationales from Lujan, probably because they
were cited by the court in Toscanino as possible grounds for dismissal of the indict-
ment. See 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 545 n.4 and accompanying text.
54. 510 F.2d at 67.
55. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 547.
56. See 420 U.S. at 119.
57. See 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 545, 547.
58. Ia- at 549.
59. Assistant Attorney General Harmon noted that other circuit courts continued
to cling to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
Harmon approved this judicial stance as a matter of policy, calling it "dictated by
logic and precedent": "It is our opinion that even where an abduction is a technical
violation of international law, a federal district court should not divest itself ofjuris-
diction over the fugitive's criminal prosecution." Id. at 546.
The argument for this position is that non-consensual extraterritorial arrests vio-
late international law because they breach the asylum state's integrity. This wrong is
not vindicated by dismissal of the indictment against the defendant, but by compen-
sating the asylum state. At the same time, the defendant does not have a sufficient
interest in the territorial integrity of the asylum state to claim that its violation merits
dismissal of the indictment against him. See Id. at 546 n. 10 and accompanying text.
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2. International Law Implications
In assessing the international law implications of the proposed opera-
tion, Assistant Attorney General Harmon focused on two sources of
legal obligation: treaties and customary international law. The relevant
treaties to be considered in the Vesco operation were the extradition
treaty between the United States and the Bahamas 60 and the United
Nations Charter. The extradition treaty would not divest a U.S. court of
its jurisdiction over the defendant, Harmon argued, because the treaty
did not make its extradition mechanism the exclusive means to obtain
custody of a fugitive.6 1 In the absence of such a provision, the mere
existence of an extradition treaty does not imply that the signatories are
limited to the procedures therein.6 2 While the U.N. Charter implicitly
prohibits non-consensual, extraterritorial arrests, 63 Harmon argued that
the "broad sweep and hortatory tone" of the Charter's language indi-
cates that the U.S. did not intend to limit the criminal jurisdiction of its
courts by signing it.64 Thus, abduction of Vesco would not violate the
extradition treaty with the Bahamas because the treaty lacks an explicit
provision making it the exclusive mechanism for apprehending fugitives,
and while the abduction would violate the U.N. treaty, that instrument is
not of sufficient legal effect in the United States to impair the jurisdic-
tion of U.S. courts.
Turning to customary international law, Harmon found that it
would be violated by the proposed operation. Forcible abduction, when
followed by even a proforma protest by the asylum state, is an impermis-
sible violation of the principle of territorial integrity under customary
international law. 65 The violation of international law involved in
abducting Vesco would "significantly heighten the litigation risks" in the
Second Circuit.66 Presumably, such a violation would not "heighten liti-
gation risks" in any other circuit because other circuits continued to fol-
low the Ker-Frisbie corollary that violation of international law will not
60. United States-Great Britain Extradition Treaty, 47 Stat. 2122 (1931), applied
to Bahamas by exchange of Notes, 30 U.S.T. 187, T.I.A.S. No. 985 (1978).
61. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 547 n.13.
62. Id. at 547. But see United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal.
1990) (extradition treaty between U.S. and Mexico construed to constitute exclusive
mechanism for rendering fugitives; abduction of Mexican national by paid agents of
U.S. government, followed by protest by Mexican government, violated treaty and
could be remedied only by return of fugitive to Mexico).
63. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 548. Such arrests violate the pledge in the
U.N. Charter to "refrain ... from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state .... U.N. CHARTER art. II, para. 4.
The U.N. resolution condemning the Israeli apprehension of Adolph Eichmann in
Argentina "is construed ... to be a definitive construction of the United Nations
Charter as proscribing forcible abduction in the absence of acquiescence by the asy-
lum state." 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 548. See also authorities cited, id. at 548
n.15.
64. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 548-49.
65. Id. at 549 (citing Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67).
66. Id. at 549.
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impair thejurisdiction of a U.S. court.6 7 Only the Second Circuit, where
Vesco would be tried, recognized dismissal because of a violation of
international law in securing the defendant.
3. Civil Liability
Assistant Attorney General Harmon also concluded that the proposed
operation would make the U.S. and its agents liable to civil suits for torts
committed in Vesco's abduction.6 8 This conclusion was underpinned by
a far more significant one: the U.S. in general, and the FBI in particular,
lack authority under U.S. law to violate international law under any
circumstances.
Harmon began by noting that Ker v. Illinois explicitly left open the
question of whether civil liability would attach to U.S. agents carrying
out an illegal arrest.69 Thus, he looked to the governing statute, the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),70 to determine whether, and to what
extent, the government would be liable for the proposed operation.
7
'
The FTCA preserves sovereign immunity for constitutional and
common law torts committed in the course of an arrest, but only if the
government acts within the limits of its authority and in good faith.
7 2
Good faith requires that the agents must believe in the validity and
necessity of the operation, and in the necessity for carrying it out in the
manner in which it was executed. 73 Harmon concluded that the good
faith requirements would be met in the Vesco case.74 Therefore, the
only relevant inquiry was whether the proposed operation fell within the
limits of the FBI's authority. If it did not, as Harmon ultimately con-
cluded, the United States and its agents would face civil liability for con-
stitutional and common law torts committed in the operation.
7 5
Harmon began his analysis of FBI authority by citing the general
principle that "law enforcement officers [act] beyond the outer limits of
their authority when they act beyond their jurisdiction." 76 The FBI's
jurisdiction is defined in the agency's general enabling statute at 28
67. See supra note 59.
68. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 555.
69. Id at 550 (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 444). -
70. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1988)). Harmon focused on the provi-
sion regarding sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
71. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 550.
72. Id. at 551 (citing Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390, 393 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972)).
73. Id.
74. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 553 ("There is ample probable cause and a
number of outstanding bench warrants.").
75. Mr. Harmon examined separately the question of civil liability for violations
of international law. He concluded that here the fugitive would have no independent
cause of action because the duty breached ran to the asylum nation, not to the fugi-
tive. Id. at 554. For an analogous reasoning for not divesting court of criminal juris-
diction where prosecution has violated international law, see supra note 59.
76. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 551 n.25 and accompanying text.
529
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U.S.C. section 533(1).77 Although section 533(1) does not explicitly
place geographical limits on the FBI's authority to conduct investiga-
tions and make arrests, such limitations must be implied. 78
In reaching that conclusion, Harmon followed two lines of analysis.
First, section 533(1) does not authorize non-consensual extraterritorial
arrests. A law implicitly authorizes all actions that are "necessary and
reasonable" to effectuate the statute's purpose.79 If an action is not
both necessary and reasonable in relation to the statute, Harmon
argued, it is not authorized by it.
The proposed operation easily met the necessity, but not the rea-
sonableness, requirement. Vesco was an indicted felon and the extradi-
tion procedure had proven incapable of reaching him.8 0 To carry out its
statutory mission to "detect and prosecute crimes against the United
States,"18 1 the FBI would have to abduct Vesco without the consent of
the Bahamian government. But such arrests violate international law
and have been widely condemned by jurists and academics, according to
Harmon. They "undermine the international order and breed disre-
spect for the traditional means of fostering cooperation and arbitrating
disputes... [and] denigrate the rule of law in the name of upholding
it."82 Because such arrests would be unreasonable under international
law, Harmon concluded it is not reasonable to infer that they are author-
ized by the statute.8 3 While necessary, the operation would be unrea-
sonable and therefore unauthorized by the statute.
Second, Harmon concluded, section 533(1) cannot authorize the FBI
to conduct non-consensual extraterritorial arrests because the United
States itself lacks authority to act in foreign countries without their con-
sent. The de jure authority of the United States ends where the de jure
authority of another sovereign begins.8 4 The United States can act
legally in a foreign country only when that country consents to the exer-
cise of U.S. power within its borders. Harmon found support for this
proposition in ChiefJustice Marshall's reasoning in The Schooner Exchange
v. M'Faddon:85
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
77. Id. at 551. Section 533(1) provides, "[t]he Attorney General may appoint offi-
cials ... to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States .... 28 U.S.C.
§ 533(1) (1988).
78. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 555.
79. Id at 552.
80. Id.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 533(1).
82. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 552 nn.27-8 and accompanying text.
83. Id. at 552.
84. Id. "The F.B.I.'s power cannot extend beyond those of the United States.
The dejure authority of the United States is necessarily limited by the sovereignty of
other nations." Id.
85. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restric-
tion, and -an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that
power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories must be traced to the consent of the nation
itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.8 6
Thus, the United States cannot make its own laws a legitimate source of
authority when it acts within the jurisdiction of another sovereign with-
out the consent of that sovereign. Therefore, the U.S. could not legally
arrest Vesco in the Bahamas without the consent of the Bahamian gov-
ernment. As a matter of U.S. constitutional law, Harmon concluded, the
United States lacked the authority to arrest Vesco without Bahamian
consent.
Having concluded that the FBI enabling statute did not and could
not authorize non-consensual extraterritorial arrests,8 7 Assistant Attor-
ney General Harmon went on to find that common law and constitu-
tional tort actions would lie against the U.S. and its agents in the wake of
the proposed operation.8 8 Although "obvious logistical problems"
would make it difficult for the captured fugitive to file suit in the state of
former asylum, Harmon concluded that a civil action could be main-
tained in the United States.8 9
4. Criminal Liability
Harmon found that the abducting agents would face criminal charges in
the asylum state.9 0 The U.S. would not extradite its agents to an asylum
state such as the Bahamas to face prosecution for an operation which
they were told by their superiors to carry out. However, those agents
should stay out of third countries which have extradition treaties with
the Bahamas. 9 '
D. Conclusion and Recommendations of 1980 Opinion
Assistant Attorney General Harmon concluded that the FBI should not
undertake the proposed operation without the asylum state's consent. 92
86. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 553 (quoting The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7
Granch) at 136).
87. Id. at 553.
88. Id. at 553-56. A plaintiff with close ties to the United States could recover for
the constitutional tort of violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, id. at 554, and
the common law torts of false imprisonment, false arrest, and assault and battery. Id.
at 554-55. While only a U.S. citizen or defendant with a strong tie to the United
States may assert a constitutional tort, any person, regardless of nationality, could
pursue a common law action. Cf id. at 555.
89. I at 555.
90. Id. at 556. The events surrounding United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.
Supp. 599 (G.D. Cal. 1990), support Harmon's conclusion in this regard. In that
case, the Mexican government has requested the arrest and extradition of DEA
agents and expatriate Mexicans who were involved in kidnapping the defendant.
91. See Statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 14-15.
92. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 556.
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First, the violation of international law involved could jeopardize suc-
cessful criminal prosecution of Vesco in the Second Circuit. Second,
because the FBI would be acting outside the scope of its authority, the
United States and its agents could be subject to a civil suit. Third, the
United States could face an "embarrassing extradition request" if the
asylum nation chose to prosecute the abductors. 93 Finally, Harmon
raised a foreign policy consideration he had otherwise ignored in the
rest of the opinion: "[I]n the current international climate, this country
can ill afford an operation that would permit others to argue that the
United States does not respect international law."
94
H0. The 1989 Opinion
A. Background
Sometime in 1987, the Criminal Investigative Division of the FBI asked
the Bureau's Office of Legal Counsel to examine the implications of var-
ious extraterritorial operations involving the seizure of specific sus-
pects. 9 5 As a result of that inquiry, the FBI's Office of Legal Counsel
requested that the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel reexam-
ine the 1980 Opinion. 96 According to Bush Administration officials, the
initial FBI inquiry was prompted by the passage of two laws conferring
extraterritorial law enforcement authority on the FBI: the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 198497 and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Anti-terrorism Act of 1986.98 Both of these statutes, however, have
been construed to require the consent of the host government for extra-
territorial operations. 99 The FBI review of extraterritorial authority has
also been described by Administration officials as motivated by the gen-
eral need to fight political and "narco-" terrorism free of the constraints
imposed by the 1980 Opinion.10 0 Nonetheless, the Administration
refused to characterize the 1989 Opinion as a change of policy, prefer-
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (Nov.
8, 1989) (Unofficial transcript, pending publication of official record) (testimony of
Oliver B. Revell, Assoc. Deputy Dir. Investigations, FBI) [hereinafter Hearing Tran-
script]; U.S. Cites Right to Seize Foreign Fugitives, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1989, at 1:6 col.
4.
96. See Hearing Transcript, supra note 95, at 46 (testimony of William P. Barr);
Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 3; see also N.Y. Times, supra note 95.
97. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 8, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 28, 29, 41, 42, 49, 50 U.S.C. (1988)).
98. Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 896 (1986) (codifiedat 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988)).
See Hearing Transcript, supra note 95, at 47 (testimony of Oliver B. Revell). See also
Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 10.
99. Hearing Transcript, supra note 95, at 34 (testimony of Oliver B. Revell).
100. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 3 ("Because such limitations
may impair our ability to defend ourselves from overt physical assaults on our citi-
zens by terrorists and the equally pernicious large-scale trafficking of drugs into the
United States by foreign criminal organizations, the F.B.I. asked the Office of Legal
Counsel to reexamine the 1980 Opinion."); see also Hearing Transcript, supra note 95,
Vol. 24
1991 International "Fugitive Snatching"
ring instead to call it a "legal analysis" of FBI authority under domestic
law.10 1 Whatever the motivations prompting the FBI inquiry, the 1989
Opinion concluded that non-consensual extraterritorial arrests are
authorized under U.S. law.10 2
The Bush Administration will not release the opinion itself.10 3
Therefore, for the structure and reasoning of the opinion, this Note will
rely on the prepared Congressional testimony of William P. Barr, the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel of
the Justice Department. This section will focus on the parts of Barr's
statement most likely to track the 1989 Opinion: his critique of the 1980
Opinion and his legal justification for reaching the conclusion that non-
consensual extraterritorial arrests are authorized under U.S. law.
B. Overview of the 1989 Opinion
Assistant Attorney General Barr followed four lines of reasoning to
reach the conclusion that non-consensual extraterritorial arrests are
authorized under U.S. law. First, the 1980 Opinion failed to consider
the controlling legislative and executive acts doctrine by which a consti-
tutionally authorized act by either branch supplants international law
norms.' 0 4 Second, the FBI's enabling statutes authorize non-consen-
sual, extraterritorial arrests. 10 5 Third, even without statutory authoriza-
tion, the legal power to conduct such arrests inheres in the President's
general constitutional authority to enforce the law. 10 6 Finally, Barr con-
cluded, the violation of international law norms is part of the natural
process of making international law.10 7 Thus, the President's constitu-
tionally granted foreign policy power authorizeshim to make interna-
tional law by breaking it. 10 8
at 42, 46 (testimony of William P. Barr) ("There was broad consensus within the
administration that the 1980 Opinion was fundamentally flawed .... ).
101. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 3-4; see Statement of Abraham
D. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 1.
102. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 4-5, 7-8, 9.
103. See supra note 16.
104. See Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 4-6.
105. See id at 6-8.
106. Id. at 9-10.
107. Id. at 11-12.
108. Id. The 1989 Opinion apparently did not address the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in
detail. Barr stated in his testimony that he agreed with the 1980 Opinion's conclu-
sion that the jurisdiction of a U.S. court would be unaffected by the due process or
prosecutorial improprieties of fugitive snatching. Id. at 3 n. 1. But as noted here, the
1980 Opinion expressed concerns about the continued viability of the Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine in the Second Circuit, even though, as a matter of policy, it argued that the
doctrine should be upheld. The 1980 Opinion's assessment of the doctrine's viability
is critiqued and its current status examined at infra notes 144-58 and accompanying
text.
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C. Reasoning of the 1989 Opinion
1. The Controlling Executive or Legislative Act Doctrine
A legislative or executive act that violates international law is legal under
U.S. domestic law, according to the 1989 Opinion, provided it falls
within the constitutional authority of the branch undertaking the
action.10 9 Any act within that authority constitutes a controlling execu-
tive or legislative act and may supplant international law. 1 10 Assistant
Attorney General Barr found authority for this proposition in three
nineteenth century United States Supreme Court cases.
The first two of the cases, according to Barr, establish the general
principle that international law is defeasible by the acts of sovereign
nations. In Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,1 11 Chief Justice Marshall
"opined" that the implied immunity of a French warship under interna-
tional law from U.S. judicial process within the territory of the United
States could be destroyed by "the sovereign [i.e., the United States] ...
either by employing force, or by subjecting such vessels to the [jurisdic-
tion of its] ordinary tribunals." 1 12 In other words, although the ship
was protected by international law, the United States could defeat the
protection by force, or by judicial process ultimately backed by force. In
Brown v. United States, 1 3 Chief Justice Marshall observed that interna-
tional law is a "guide... addressed to the judgement of the sovereign,"
which can be disregarded at will. 1 4 Its only weight derives from the
immorality and public criticism attendant in disregarding it. 115 Barr
noted that Marshall made no distinction between violations of interna-
tional law that occur within U.S. territory and the violation of interna-
tional law that occurs by "infring[ing] on the territorial sovereignty of
foreign nations" by abducting fugitives. 116 Barr inferred that these
cases support U.S. authority to violate international law in all cases,
including fugitive abduction.
Finally, in The Paquete Habana, 117 the Supreme Court distilled these
general principles into a definite legal rule: the controlling executive
and legislative act doctrine. Simply put, "in the exercise of his constitu-
109. See Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 4-5.
110. Id.
111. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The 1980 Opinion cited The Schooner Exchange
to support the proposition that the United States cannot legitimately exercise its sov-
ereignty within the jurisdiction of another nation without that nation's consent.
112. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 5 (quoting The Schooner
Exchange, 11 U.S. at 146).
113. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814).
114. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 5 (quoting Brown, 12 U.S. at
128).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 6. Of course, the Court in The Schooner Exchange and in Brown was not
considering the latter issue. It is also worth noting that in both cases the Supreme
Court held that the violation of international law was improper. The language relied
upon by Barr was dicta. See infra note 180 (Brown) and text accompanying note 212
(The Schooner Exchange).
117. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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tional authority, the President may depart from international law by a
'controlling executive .... act.' "118 International law, which is totally
defeasible by sovereign power, cannot make illegal under domestic law
executive or legislative acts authorized by the Constitution. Therefore,
even though fugitive snatching violates international law, it is legal
under U.S. law if duly authorized by Congress or the President.
2. FBI Enabling Statutes
The FBI's general enabling statutes, 119 according to Barr, "carry into
execution the President's core executive law enforcement power
.... ,,120 This power "intersects with [the President's] constitutional
responsibilities in the field of foreign relations" where extraterritorial
action is concerned. 12 1 Citing Justice Jackson's famous concurring
opinion in the Steel Seizure case, Barr argued that the broad terms of the
statute should be read with deference to executive prerogative in the
core areas of law enforcement and foreign affairs.12 2 Because the Presi-
dent has "authority to override customary international law" when he
acts within his constitutional sphere, that power should not be
restrained by a restrictive reading of the statute. 12 3 Therefore, the stat-
utes should be read to authorize non-consensual extraterritorial arrests
in violation of international law.
3. The President's Inherent Law Enforcement Power
According to Assistant Attorney General Barr, the 1980 Opinion failed
to recognize that "[q]uite apart from the question of whether the FBI
has statutory authority to override customary international law," the
President may order it to do so pursuant to his "inherent constitutional
118. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 6 (quoting The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. at 700).
119. In addition to 28 U.S.C. § 533(1), considered in the 1980 Opinion, the 1989
Opinion also considered 18 U.S.C. § 3052 as one of the FBI's general enabling acts.
This law, 62 Stat. 817 (1948), as amended by 64 Stat. 1239 (1951), should have been
considered in the 1980 Opinion as one of the FBI's general enabling acts. It
provides:
The Director, Associate Director, Assistant to the Director, Assistant Direc-
tors, inspectors, and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the
Department of Justice may carry firearms, serve warrants and subpoenas
issued under the authority of the United States and make arrests without war-
rant for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or
for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
or is committing such felony.
28 U.S.C. § 3052.
120. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 8.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("I should indulge the widest latitude of interpreta-
tion to sustain [the President's] exclusive function to command the instruments of
national force, at least when turned against the outside world for the security of our
society.")).
123. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 8.
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power to authorize law enforcement activities."'1 24 That power derives
from the President's "general executive authority under Article II and
his constitutional responsibility to 'take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.' ",125 This inherent law enforcement power allows the Presi-
dent to violate international law, under the controlling act doctrine,
without congressional authorization. 12 6
According to Barr, the principle of inherent law enforcement power
was established in In Re Neagle.12 7 In Neagle, the Supreme Court held
that the President's constitutional duty to execute the laws is not limited
to the terms of statutes or treaties but "extends also to the 'rights, duties
and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international
relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government
under the Constitution.' ",128 Where this general law enforcement
authority "intersects" with the President's foreign affairs power, the
result is a strong independent basis of "legislative" power. 129 Pursuant
to this independent authority, the President may "direct Executive
Branch agents to carry out arrests that contravene customary interna-
tional law and other international law principles which our legislature
has not acted upon to make part of our domestic law."' 130 Barr thus
implied that customary international law is not really a part of U.S. law
without statutory enactment and that the President is free to disregard
such law when exercising his independent powers.
According to Barr, the three general lines of reasoning- the con-
trolling executive acts doctrine, the breadth of FBI authority pursuant to
its general enabling acts, and the President's inherent law enforcement
authority-converged in the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Garcia-Mir v.
Meese.13 1 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Attorney
General was authorized to detain Cuban refugees indefinitely, even
though such detention violated customary international law and was not
specifically authorized by statute. 13 2 The Attorney General's detention
order constituted a controlling executive act which, according to the
court, supplanted international law.' 3 3 The court rejected the Attor-
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id.
126. Id at 4-5.
127. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
128. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 9 (quoting In Re Neagle, 135
U.S. at 64-67). The court held in Neagle that the Attorney General did not need statu-
tory authorization to order U.S. Marshals to protect a Supreme Court justice.
129. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 9-10. Barr cited John Jay to
support the principle that the President has lawmaking powers when acting within his
own constitutional sphere. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 394 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
("[a]ll constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial depart-
ment, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legis-
lature ....").
130. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 10.
131. 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
132. Id. at 1454-55.
133. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 11 (citing Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d
at 1454-55).
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ney General's argument that 8 U.S.C. section 1227(a) contained author-
ity for the detentions and found instead that the Attorney General's
inherent constitutional power to order the detentions in violation of
international law was sufficient on its own account. Nonetheless, Assis-
tant Attorney General Barr argued that the statute itself authorized the
detentions. The detention statute, he argued, is analogous to the broad
FBI enabling statutes.' 3 4 Like the enabling statutes, the detention stat-
ute does not explicitly authorize the violation of international law.'
3 5
But such authority may be implied because the statute operates in a
sphere of independent executive power. According to Barr, Garda-Mir
illustrates that the President has the authority to violate international
law when he operates "in an area such as law enforcement, where [he]
has constitutional authority and his agents have broad statutory
authority."' 3 6
4. The Nature of International Law
Finally, according to Assistant Attorney General Barr, the President's
power to violate customary international law can be inferred from the
very nature of that law. 13 7 Customary international law is a set of princi-
ples, which exists by the consensus of nations and evolves with their
practices.13 8 Each nation has the power to create a new rule or principle
by acting in the world arena, although it is liable for breaching existing
customary law until the norm inherent in its action becomes accepted by
the community of nations.1 39 In giving the President foreign affairs
powers, the Constitution granted the authority to participate in the for-
mation and evolution of international law.' 40 Thus, the President must
have authority under domestic law to exceed the current limits of inter-
national law.
M. Analysis
The Analysis portion of this Note is divided into three sections. The
first critiques the 1980 Opinion's evaluation of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
and assesses the current viability of that doctrine.' 4 1 The second exam-
ines the authority of the President under domestic law to order forcible
apprehension of fugitives in violation of international law.142 The final
section examines the policy implications that follow from the legal con-
clusions reached in the first two sections of the analysis.1
43
134. See id. at 10-11.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 11.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 11-12.
140. Id. at 12.
141. See infra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 159-296 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 297-313 and accompanying text.
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A. The Current Status of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
As the 1980 Opinion pointed out, Toscanino laid two independent foun-
dations for divestment of a court's jurisdiction over a defendant forcibly
abducted in violation of international law. The first rested on modern
notions of due process, 14 4 and the second on an appellate court's super-
visory power over district courts. 14 5 Mistreatment of the defendant and
violation of international law could justify dismissal of the indictment as
a matter of due process or judicial administration.
The due process rationale of Toscanino, which focused on the
alleged mistreatment of the defendant, was progressively restricted in
subsequent Second Circuit cases, beginning with United States ex rel Lujan
v. Gengler, to include only severe mistreatment. 14 6 In three cases since
Toscanino, the Supreme Court has further restricted Toscanino by reaf-
firming the due process aspects of Ker-Frisbee.t 47 The Supreme Court
rejected any due process analogy, such as that made by the Second Cir-
cuit in Toscanino, between the rationale of the exclusionary rule of evi-
dence and a rule favoring dismissal of charges because of government
misconduct.' 48 The Toscanino exception to the Ker-Frisbie rule provides
that only government conduct which "shocks the conscience" justifies
dismissal. While this exception has become an accepted part of the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine,14 9 it has never been used. 150
The supervisory powers strand of Toscanino and the part of the deci-
sion concerned with violations of international law have technically sur-
vived. The international law issue was tacitly reserved in dicta in Lujan,
as noted by the 1980 Opinion. 15 ' It was explicitly reserved in the con-
curring opinion of Judge Oakes in United States v. Lira, 15 2 decided a few
months after Lujan and a few days after Gerstein v. Pugh, the first recent
Supreme Court case upholding the Ker-Frisbie rule.' 5 3 Judge Oakes took
note of the Supreme Court's decision in Gerstein but observed that appel-
late courts may still "wish to bar jurisdiction in an abduction case as a
matter not of constitutional law but in the exercise of our supervisory
144. 500 F.2d at 275.
145. Id. at 276.
146. 510 F.2d. 62 (1975). See also United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.
1981).
147. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975); United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463, 477-78 (1980) (five justices concur that Frisbie v. Collins controls case);
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-40
(1984).
148. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. at 478-79.
149. Cf supra note I (Toscanino exception incorporated into RESTATEMENT
§ 433(2)).
150. See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros ex rel. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040, 1045
(S.D. Ill. 1988), aft'd 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct.
209 (1990).
151. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
152. 515 F.2d 68, 72-73 (2d. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
153. 420 U.S. at 119.
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power... over district courts." 1 54 Although this line of attack on Ker-
Frisbie has technically survived, it has never been used or espoused by
any federal court since Lira.155 Even in Lira, the reasoning was con-
tained only in a concurring opinion.
When the 1980 Opinion was written, it was reasonable to believe
that abduction of a defendant in clear violation of international law
might lead to dismissal of the indictment in the Second Circuit. Since
Ker v. Illinois, no American court had heard a case involving an actual
violation of international law where the asylum state protested the
breach of its territorial integrity by abducting agents.1 5 6 The question
was legally open. Because the proposed abduction of Vesco hypothe-
sized a genuine violation of international law, including a protest by the
asylum state, it was reasonable to suppose that the Second Circuit might
dismiss the case in light of its recent decisions criticizing and narrowing
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. But the passage of time now indicates that the
initial movement in the Second Circuit towards abandoning the doctrine
has not continued there or anywhere else. 15 7 As the law currently
stands, it seems unlikely that any American court would depart from the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine and dismiss an indictment on the grounds that forci-
ble abduction of the defendant in defiance of international law violated
the defendant's due process rights. 158
154. 515 F.2d at 73.
155. See, e.g., 697 F. Supp. at 1045-48.
156. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 432, reporter's note 3.
157. While the Ker-Frisbie doctrine remains as strong as ever, a new remedy has
opened in an unanticipated quarter for at least some defendants abducted in viola-
tion of international law. In United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal.
1990), the federal district court ordered the government to release a defendant
whose kidnapping from Mexico was arranged by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
and officially protested by the Mexican government. The court held that the kidnap-
ping violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico and could
be remedied only by returning the defendant to his home country. Id. at 614. The
defendant's release has been stayed pending appeal of the district court's ruling that
it lacked jurisdiction to try the defendant. Significantly, the district court rejected the
defendant's claim that he should be released under the Toscanino exception to the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine, finding that the defendant had not been subjected to "outra-
geous conduct" at the hands of the authorities. Id. at 605-06. Moreover, the court
explicitly recognized the continued viability of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. Id.
158. The Supreme Court's attitude on the subject may have been revealed in the
recent case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1058
(1990), a case arising out of the same events as United States v. Caro-Quintero. In
Verdugo, the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply against evidence
seized by U.S. officials in a foreign country in a manner that would have violated the
Fourth Amendment if the defendant had been an American citizen or the seizure had
occurred in the United States. The Court emphasized the need to allow U.S. authori-
ties maximum freedom to carry out law enforcement and military activities abroad,
the same policy justifications that would be offered in support of any official fugitive
abduction scheme. Id. at 1056. To the extent that admission of evidence and mainte-
nance ofjurisdiction over defendants are analogous, the case indicates the Supreme
Court may not be inclined to go back on the Ker-Frisbie rule.
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B. Domestic Law Authority of the President to Order Forcible
Apprehension of Fugitives in Violation of International Law
The primary disagreement between the 1980 and 1989 Opinions is their
diametrically opposed conclusions on the domestic law authority of the
FBI to abduct fugitives from overseas in violation of international law.
The 1980 opinion found that authority lacking on two grounds. First, it
applied a simple rule of statutory interpretation to conclude that the
FBI's general enabling statutes do not authorize activities that violate
international law.' 59 Second, it concluded that under U.S. law the
United States cannot assert dejure authority in a foreign country without
that country's consent.1 60 The 1989 Opinion considered these same
issues but in reverse order. First, it concluded that the United States is
generally authorized under its domestic law to violate international law
through a "controlling legislative or executive act."1 6 1 That authority
includes the power to act in other countries without their consent. Sec-
ond, it argued that the FBI's general enabling statutes authorize non-
consensual extraterritorial arrests because any broad grant of authority
to the President in the area of law enforcement must implicitly carry the
power to violate international law. 16 2 Third, it argued that, even with-
out statutory authorization, the President and high level executive offi-
cials can order, pursuant to the Chief Executive's inherent law
enforcement powers, forcible apprehension of fugitives in violation of
international law.i 63
This section considers these issues in three sub-sections. The first
examines the legal doctrines which empower the President and Con-
gress to violate international law. 164 It criticizes the conclusion of the
1980 Opinion that the United States does not have de jure authority
under its own laws to act in foreign countries without their consent. The
second sub-section looks at the specific question of whether Congress
granted "snatching authority" to the FBI in its general enabling acts. 165
Whether or not such authority was granted determines the scope of the
agency's power to carry out such arrests as a matter of both foreign rela-
tions law, under the controlling acts doctrine, and constitutional law,
under traditional separation of powers analysis. The sub-section con-
cludes that Congress neither authorized nor explicitly forbade the FBI
from carrying out non-consensual extraterritorial arrests. In light of
that conclusion, the third sub-section assesses the authority of the Presi-
dent and executive officers to order fugitive snatching in violation of
international law.' 6 6 It concludes that, under both the controlling acts
159. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 167-217 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 218-48 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 249-296 and accompanying text.
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doctrine and a separation of powers analysis, the President and lower
officials have the power to order the forcible abduction of fugitives with-
out express congressional authorization.
1. Domestic Law Authority of the U.S. To Act In Violation of International
Law
a. Status of International Law in U.S. Law
The 1989 Opinion implied that customary international law is not a part
of the law of the United States until enacted by statute.1 6 7 This conclu-
sion is clearly erroneous. Customary international law and treaties are
part of the domestic law of the United States.168 Although the Constitu-
tion explicitly incorporates only treaties into U.S. law,169 the Supreme
Court has long recognized that customary international law is part of
U.S. law. 7 0 While experts offer many theories to explain how custom-
ary international law became a part of U.S. law, its incorporation was
167. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
168. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987). Three sections read together explain the general place of customary interna-
tional law and international agreements as part of the law of the United States:
Section 111. International Law and Agreements as Law of the United States
(1) International law and agreements of the United States with other
nations are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the
several states.
Section 112. Determination and Interpretation of International Law: Law of
the United States
(1) International law is determined and interpreted in the United States
by reference to the sources of international law cited in § 102...
Section 102. Sources of International Law
(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by
the international community of states
(a) in the form of customary law;
(b) by international agreement; or
(c) by derivation from the general principles common to the major
legal systems of the world.
169. U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
170. The leading articulation of the principle that customary international law is
part of U.S. law is found in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The Court
held that the breach of customary international law entitled Cuban plaintiffs to
receive damages for seizure of their fishing boats by the U.S. Navy during the Span-
ish-American War: "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions
of right depending on it are duly presented for their determination." See also Henkin,
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Centuy of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny,
100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 873 n.90 and accompanying text (1987).
Cornell International Law Journal
apparently an incident of independence from Great Britain and the
assumption of sovereign status by the United States in the family of
nations.171
That customary international law is integrated into the substantive
law of the United States implies a second principle: it may be "legally"
repudiated only when Congress or the President exercises constitutional
lawmaking authority.' 7 2 Congress holds broad legislative power under
the U.S. Constitution, 17 3 and the scope of its power to alter U.S. inter-
national law obligations is equally broad.174 In contrast, the President is
the "executive Power" by the terms of the Constitution.' 7 5 The Presi-
dent's duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed' 176 com-
prehends the obligation to obey and enforce customary international
law. 17 7 If the President is to violate international law instead of execute
it, the power to do so must stem either from a statute or, in the absence
of one, from independent lawmaking powers inherent in the President's
constitutional duties.' 78 The President's power to violate international
law without statutory authorization is thus co-extensive with the Presi-
dency's constitutional sphere of independent action.
171. See Henkin, supra note 170, at 865-66 nn.60-62 and accompanying text, 868
nn.69-70 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 111, com-
ment b.
Customary international law and English common law were incorporated into U.S.
law by similar means, which inevitably leads to analogies between the two. But there
are important differences, particularly in the way they interact with statutes. In
Anglo-American jurisprudence, common law is inferior to statutes. See Henkin, supra
note 170, at 875-76. In contrast, customary international law (like treaties) is equal
in status to statutes. Id at 878. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 115, com-
ment a. A statute will not supersede an existing rule of customary international law
unless the statute evinces a "clear purpose" to do so or the rule and the statute
cannot be "fairly reconciled." Id. at §§ 114, 115(l)(a). The deference courts owe to
a rule of customary international law is thus greater than that owed to a rule of com-
mon law when a later-in-time statute is enacted dealing with the same matter. More-
over, it is possible that a rule of customary international law which develops later in
time than a statute will supersede the statute, although no court has ever actually
reached that result. Id. at § 115, comment d. See also id. at § 102, comment j. In
contrast, common law by its very definition cannot supersede an earlier statute.
Professor Henkin advances arguments to support the proposition that customary
international law should be superior to domestic legislative enactments. Henkin,
supra note 170, at 877. The Constitutions of Greece, Italy and the Federal Republic
of Germany give precedence to customary international law over domestic statutes.
Id. at 877 n.101. France and the Netherlands give such precedence to treaties only.
Id. at 871 n.78.
172. See Henkin, supra note 170, at 879, 881. Liability remains under international
law for any breach, notwithstanding the legality of the action under U.S. law. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 115(1)(b) ("That a rule of international law or a provi-
sion of an international agreement is superseded as domestic law does not relieve the
United States of its international obligation or of the consequences of a violation of
that obligation.") See also id. at § 115, comment b.
173. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
174. See Henkin, supra note 170, at 879.
175. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
176. Id. at art. II, § 3.
177. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 111, comment c.
178. Henkin, supra note 170, at 879, 881.
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b. The Later-in-Time, or "Controlling" Acts Doctrine
Although the Constitution does not declare a hierarchy of statutory law
over international law, 179 a clear rule that later-in-time statutes will
supersede preexisting rules of international law has emerged by judicial
construction. Early nineteenth century cases alluded to the principle,18 0
but it was not clearly stated until 1888 in Whitney v. Robinson.'81 In that
case, the Supreme Court held:
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of
like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instru-
ment to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given
to either over the other ... [I]f the two are inconsistent, the one last in
date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty
on the subject is self-executing. 18 2
Twelve years later, the principle that a later-in-time statute will super-
sede a treaty obligation of the United States was applied to customary
international law in The Paquete Habana. 18 3 With both customary inter-
national law and treaties, a statute will not supersede an international
obligation unless the purpose of the legislature to breach the obligation
179. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (Congress' power to define and punish pira-
cies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations);
id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (forbidding states from entering into treaties, alliances or con-
federations); id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (President's power to make treaties with advice
and consent of Senate); id. at art. III, § 2, d. I (extending judicial power of the
United States to cases arising under treaties); id. at art. VI, § 2 (declaring supremacy
of U.S. treaties over state law). See also Henkin, supra note 170, at 867 ("The Consti-
tution expressly establishes neither the relation of treaties and customary law to each
other nor that of either to the Constitution or to laws enacted by Congress.").
180. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) ("Till such an act [of Con-
gress] be passed, the Court is bound by the law of nations which is part of the law of
the land."); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814) ("This usage [of the
law of nations] is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will. The
rule, like other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is addressed
to the judgement of the sovereign; and although it cannot be disregarded by him
without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded.").
Taken out of context, as it was in Assistant Attorney General Barr's testimony
about the 1989 Opinion, the quote from Brown is frequently used to support the
principle that the United States may disregard international law. In the context of
Brown, however, such an interpretation is dubious. ChiefJustice Marshall made the
statement in the course of explaining why seizure of British property found in the
U.S. during the War of 1812 could not be undertaken by the executive or the courts
without legislative authorization. Id at 129. Because the rule of customary interna-
tional law that enemy property may be seized during time of war "was addressed to
the judgement of the sovereign," Congress was the proper entity to make the policy
decision of whether or not the right granted by international law should be exercised.
Id. at 128. Chief Justice Marshall was not addressing the question of whether Con-
gress or the President is empowered to violate international law. He was addressing
the question of which branch should make the decision to exercise a right granted by
international law. See also Henkin, supra note 170, at 867-68 n.67 (criticizing use of
The Nereide to support the principle that Congress is empowered to violate interna-
tional law).
181. 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
182. Id. at 194.
183. 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708 (1900).
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is clear, and no other construction of the statute is "fairly possible."' 8 4
The Paquete Habana not only extended the later-in-time rule to a new
object, customary international law, but it also added a new subject-the
President. In what one commentator referred to as "opaque dic-
tum,"18 5 and what anyone would agree was casual comment, the Court
opined that customary international law applies in the absence of a
"controlling executive ... act." 18 6 Thus, the Court implied that a con-
trolling executive act supersedes a rule of customary international law in
the event of conflict.' 8 7 The timidity of the original statement of the
doctrine is reflected in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States. Sections 114 and 115, regarding the rule of
decision to be applied in the event of a conflict between U.S. law and
international law, refer only to the controlling effect of a later-in-time
statute.'8 8 The power of the President to violate international law is not
mentioned in the "black letter" sections or in the comments to those
184. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at §§ 114, 115(1)(a).
Section 114. Interpretation of Federal Statute in Light of International Law
or Agreement
Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not
to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of
the United States.
Section 115. Inconsistency Between International Law or Agreement and
Domestic Law: Law of the United States.
(1)(a) An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law
or a provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if
the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear,
or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.
See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("an Act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possi-
ble construction remains ...").
185. Henkin, supra note 170, at 863.
186. 175 U.S. at 700.
187. That the "controlling executive act" language is dictum is obvious from both
the facts of The Paquete Habana and the actual words of the quote. The full quotation
is:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis-
tered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For
this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legisla-
tive act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations ....
Id. The reasoning that customary "international law is part of our law" was necessary
to support the decision in the case and thus constitutes the holding. The Court
decided that Cuban plaintiffs were entitled to damages for seizure of their fishing
boats by the U.S. Navy, id. at 714, because such seizure violated the rule of customary
international law that fishing vessels "unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful
calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish are exempt from seizure as prizes of
war." Id. at 708. The rule of decision was thus supplied by customary international
law and recognized as "part of our law" in the holding. There was no "controlling
executive act" to overcome customary international law because the seizure was car-
ried out by naval officers without higher authorization. Id. at 712-13.
188. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at §§ 115, 115(l)(a).
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sections. 189 The "President's power to supersede international law or
agreement" is relegated instead to the Reporter's Note to Section
115.190 Regardless of its origin or wisdom, the current viability of the
"controlling executive act doctrine" is nevertheless generally
accepted. 19 1 When acting within their constitutional spheres, both Con-
gress and the President are empowered under U.S. law to pass statutes
or take actions which violate international law.1
9 2
c. Critique of the Two Justice Department Opinions' Analyses of
U.S. Authority to Violate International Law
In light of the controlling acts doctrine, there can be little doubt that the
1980 Opinion incorrectly concluded that neither Congress nor the Pres-
ident has the power to authorize or execute law enforcement actions in
other nations without their consent. 19 While acting in another country
without its consent clearly violates fundamental rules of international
law protecting the sovereignty of states, ' 9 4 there is no reason to believe
that such actions receive particular disapproval under the U.S. legal sys-
tem. Non-consensual extraterritorial arrests, like any violation of inter-
national law, are legal under U.S. law if they are within the constitutional
powers of the branch authorizing the operation. 19 5 Thus, if FBI agents
were explicitly authorized by Congress to abduct fugitives from foreign
countries, their statutory jurisdiction would incorporate that extraterri-
torial field of operation. The agents would be immune under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act against a suit by the abducted fugitive because they
would have acted within their jurisdiction, and thus their authority, in
undertaking the operation. 19 6 While the Federal Tort Claims Act would
protect them in the United States, it would not protect them against suit
in international fora or the former state of asylum.
197
Assistant Attorney General Harmon relied on The Schooner Exchange
v. M'Faddon 198 in the 1980 Opinion to find an absolute limit on U.S.
authority to assert jurisdiction in another country without its consent.
In his 1989 congressional testimony, Assistant Attorney General Barr
called that reliance "misplaced."' 199 Indeed, The Schooner Exchange occu-
pies no place in the legal doctrine on the general authority of the United
States to violate international law. The case is not cited in discussions of
189. Id.
190. Id. at § 115, reporter's note 3.
191. See id. See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrrTUTION 221-22,
460 n.61 (1972). But cf. Henkin, supra note 170, at 883 ("The Supreme Court has
never addressed the validity of any claim of presidential power to order deviations
from customary international law.").
192. L. HENKIN, supra note 191, at 221-22, 460 n.61.
193. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 551.
194. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 432(2) and comment b.
195. See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
196. Cf supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
197. Statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 15.
198. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
199. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 4.
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that topic in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States,20 0 nor in any of the major constitutional and interna-
tional law treatises and casebooks. 20 ' The major significance of The
Schooner Exchange, rather, is as the leading case on the broad sovereign
immunity of a state and its instrumentalities against the jurisdiction of
the courts of another state.20 2 In this context, the quote from The
Schooner Exchange used by Assistant Attorney General Harmon does not
bar the United States from acting in another country without its consent.
It simply holds that the implied immunity of an official foreign entity
within the jurisdiction of the United States may be defeated by the
United States exercising official jurisdiction over the entity.20 3
Reexamining the exact words of the quote from The Schooner
Exchange illustrates the difference between its use in the 1980 Opinion
and its meaning in the context of the case:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclu-
sive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.
Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would
imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and
an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which
could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation
itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.20 4
In the 1980 Opinion, Assistant Attorney General Harmon used this lan-
guage to reason that the United States, "an external source" of law in
relation to the asylum state, the Bahamas, could not make its laws a
legitimate source of authority in the Bahamas to kidnap a fugitive there.
Any exception to the "full and complete power" of the Bahamas within
its jurisdiction would have to stem from the consent of that govern-
ment.20 5 While the bare words of the quote may support such an inter-
200. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at Part I, Chapter 2 ("Status of Interna-
tional Law and Agreements in United States Law.").
201. See, e.g., L. HENKIN,supra note 191, at 29-88, 205-24,passim (1972); L. HENKIN,
R. PUGH, 0. SCHACTER, H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAw CASES AND MATERIALS, (1980);
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 4-4 (1988); J. NowAcK, R. ROTUNDA, J.
YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw, Chap. 6 (1986).
202. See, e.g., Lilly,Jurisdiction Over Domestic And Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85,
120 n.120 (1983). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at Part IV, Chapter 5, Sub-
chapter A, Introductory Note, n.1.
203. See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145:
It seems then to the Court, to be a principle of public law, that national ships
of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception are to
be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction.
Without doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this impli-
cation.
Id. The Court held that The Exchange, a French warship, was immune from judicial
process in the United States because the U.S. Government had not expressly revoked
the implied promise of sovereign immunity.
204. Id. at 136.
205. See 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 552-553.
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pretation, 20 6 the facts are so distinguishable as to make Harmon's
reliance on the case unsound. In context, the quote means that France,
"an external source" of law in relation to the United States, cannot
infuse its instrumentalities, here the warship Exchange, with immunity
from the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.207 Such an immu-
nity, "an exception to the full and complete power" of the United States,
may stem only from the implied consent of the United States.20 8 This
consent may also be revoked. 20 9
The argument can be made that if The Schooner Exchange addresses
the general power of the United States to violate international law, it
does not diminish that power but, to the contrary, affirms it. The
"external source" of law referred to in the language quoted can be con-
strued as international obligation; the implication of sovereign immunity
arises from a web of duties that sovereigns owe to each other.2 10 Such
obligations among nations are the essence of international law. The
implication of immunity, "a principle of public [international] law," can
be destroyed by the United States acting within its territorial jurisdic-
tion.211 That the United States can do so legally does not argue for the
strength of international law constraints on sovereign power; rather, it
tends to show that the United States, exercising its sovereign power, can
defeat immunities created by international law.
It is best to view The Schooner Exchange as neither a general endorse-
ment of nor a prohibition against the violation of international law. It
certainly does not stand for the view asserted by Assistant Attorney Gen-
206. See Note, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1320, 1321 n.n. 6-7 and accompanying text (1983). Because The Schooner
Exchange stands for the "strict territoriality" principle, it was cited in American juris-
prudence to prohibit extension of U.S. courts' jurisdiction, in discovery for example,
to a foreign state. That use of The Schooner Exchange, which is no longer good law, is
analogous to the way Assistant Attorney General Harmon used it-if discovery is
prohibited in foreign countries, so too is fugitive abduction.
207. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch), at 143. After listing examples of
official instrumentalities that enjoy an implied immunity when in the territory of a
foreign sovereign, the Court summarized, "The preceding reasoning has maintained
the proposition that all exemptions from territorial jurisdiction must be derived from
the consent of the sovereign of the territory... " Id. Compare the language quoted
by the Court from the 1980 Opinion: "All exceptions ... to the full and complete
power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself." Id at 136.
208. Id. at 136.
209. Ia at 146.
210. See, e.g., id. at 136
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights
and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse
with each other, and by an interchange of those good offices which humanity
dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in
practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and
complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty
confers.
See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at Part IV, Chapter 5, Subchapter A, Introductory
Note.
211. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 145-46.
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eral Barr that the United States is generally empowered to violate inter-
national law. The holding of The Schooner Exchange was an effort to
protect the implied immunity of a foreign warship, thus upholding cus-
tomary international law against the jurisdictional pretensions of an
American court.212 The rule of decision, as in The Paquete Habana, was
supplied by international law. The case is not cited by authorities to
support the power of the United States to violate international law, any
more than it is cited to prohibit such violations.
In relying on sources such as Brown v. United States213 and The
Paquete Habana,2 14 however, Assistant Attorney General Barr was
squarely within the mainstream of American jurisprudence on the power
of Congress and the President to violate international law. 2 15 Given
that legal doctrine, his congressional testimony indicates that the 1989
Opinion reached the correct conclusion regarding the authority of Con-
gress and the President to violate international law through "controlling
legislative or executive acts." Courts will recognize the legality of such
acts so long as they are undertaken pursuant to constitutional author-
ity2 16 and the purpose of the act to violate international law is clear.21 7
2. Congressional Authorization for Fugitive Snatching
a. Interpretation of the FBI Enabling Acts
Both the 1980 and the 1989 opinions claimed statutory approval for
their point of view. The 1980 Opinion concluded that fugitive snatching
was prohibited by the FBI's general enabling act. 2 18 The Opinion's
author argued that to read the act as authorizing fugitive snatching
would be unreasonable in light of international law prohibiting the prac-
tice and the "substantial criticism" of legal authorities condemning it.219
In describing the 1989 Opinion, however, Assistant Attorney General
Barr interpreted the FBI enabling acts as "permitting" fugitive snatch-
ing and, at another point, he strongly implied that the acts constituted
"statutory authority" for it.2 20
212. Id. at 146.
213. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
214. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
215. But see supra notes 180 & 187, criticizing the use of Brown and The Paquete
Habana, respectively, as support for the power of Congress and the President to vio-
late international law.
216. L. HENKIN, supra note 191, at 221-22, 460 n.61.
217. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at §§ 114-15.
218. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 551, 553 (construing 28 U.S.C. § 533(1)).
219. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 552. As discussed supra note 79 and accom-
panying text, Harmon relied on a general rule of statutory interpretation to conclude
that the FBI's enabling act did not authorize fugitive abduction. In doing so, he
ignored the specific rule for construing statutes that conflict with international law:
statutes will not be construed to violate international law unless they evince a clear
purpose to do so and no other construction is fairly possible. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, at §§ 114, 115. Applying that rule to the vague language of the FBI's
enabling act would have easily supported the conclusion that Harmon was aiming
for-that the statute did not authorize the violation of international law.
220. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 8-9.
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To some extent, the apparent disagreement between the two opin-
ions is readily traced to misunderstanding. While they appear to clash
on the question of statutory authorization, both opinions agreed that the
FBI statutes did not, of their own force and effect, authorize the FBI to
abduct fugitives. The 1980 Opinion held that the international law pro-
hibition against fugitive snatching had to be implied in the vague lan-
guage of the FBI statutes. 2 2 1 That prohibition prevented the FBI, acting
on its own power, from abducting fugitives. Assistant Attorney General
Barr essentially agreed with this conclusion when he described the
nature of the "permission" to violate international law granted by the
FBI's enabling acts: "[T]he FBI's general enabling statutes should be
construed as permitting the agency to take extraterritorial action...
when the agency has been directed to do so by a 'controlling executive act' that
supplants customary international law." 22 2 Thus, according to both opin-
ions, the FBI cannot abduct fugitives on its own authority. According to
the 1989 Opinion, however, it can abduct fugitives pursuant to an order
from higher up in the Executive Branch-"a controlling executive
act"-which is itself "authorized" by the broad terms of the statute.
Nonetheless, Assistant Attorney General Barr apparently under-
stood the 1980 Opinion to say that the FBI statute absolutely forbids the
President, and not just the FBI acting on its own authority, from order-
ing fugitive snatching. 22 3 It was important for him to contradict that
proposition; if the statute forbids fugitive snatching, the President may
lack the independent power to order it in the face of a congressional
negative. According to Justice Jackson's widely cited concurrence
explaining Executive authority in the Steel Seizure Case, when the Presi-
dent attempts to act on the basis of his own authority in the face of a
congressional prohibition, his powers are at their "lowest ebb." 2 24
The 1980 Opinion, however, never claimed that the FBI statute con-
stituted a restraint on the President from ordering fugitive snatching.
That limitation, rather, arose from some natural law restriction on extra-
territorial jurisdiction "revealed" to the author of the 1980 Opinion
from the words of The Schooner Exchange. This limitation supposedly
extended to the United States generally, including Congress and the
President; but, as noted above, 225 this interpretation of The Schooner
Exchange and the attendant doctrine of limited U.S. power has little foun-
dation in U.S. law.
In attempting to rebut an argument that the 1980 Opinion did not
actually make-that the FBI enabling acts forbid the President and high
level executive officials from ordering fugitive snatching-Assistant
Attorney General Barr reached several incorrect conclusions. He rea-
soned that the FBI statute "authorizes" and "permits" fugitive snatch-
221. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 552.
222. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 8 (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 7.
224. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
225. See supra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
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ing simply because it is a vague law enforcement act. 22 6 Law
enforcement is an area where the President has "broad authority.
2 27
Barr implied that whenever Congress passes a vague act in an area
where the President has broad authority, it has sanctioned the violation
of international law. 2 28 But the rule with respect to statutes and interna-
tional law is clear: statutes do not authorize the violation of interna-
tional law unless they evince a clear purpose to do so and no other
construction is fairly possible.2 29 Because a vague statute cannot evince
a clear purpose to violate international law, the President must rely on
his own powers to order fugitive snatching.23 0 The authority to do so
cannot be implied by a vague statute.
In sum, while Assistant Attorney General Barr referred to "statu-
tory authority" and permission for fugitive snatching,23 ' he really estab-
lished no more than that the silence of the FBI enabling acts is not a
prohibition on the President. Mere silence does not constitute a Con-
gressional restriction on a co-equal entity like the President where, as in
foreign affairs and law enforcement, he has independent powers.
23 2
However, the limits of international law on U.S. jurisdiction should be
read into the statutory silence of the FBI enabling acts to constrain the
agency, a subordinate executive entity, from abducting fugitives without
higher authorization.
226. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 8.
227. Id. at 9. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrtrrIONAL LAW, §§ 4-11 (1988).
228. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 8.
This conclusion is both highly significant and erroneous. It is significant because
the President's power is at its absolute maximum, legally and politically, when he acts
pursuant to the express will of Congress. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). Especially in the area of foreign affairs, the
Supreme Court has held that the President has broad powers pursuant to general
enabling acts. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936). But this rule is not cited as supporting the President's authority to violate
international law. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 201, at § 4-4; J. NOWACK, R.
ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 6.2; L. HENKIN, supra note 191, at 209-
10. That Congress allows the President broad discretion in foreign affairs does not
necessarily mean it has given him its approval to violate international law.
229. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at §§ 114-115; See also The Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
230. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring):
When the President acts in the absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely on his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes . . .enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contempo-
rary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
Id.
231. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 8.
232. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 579 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
Vol. 24
1991 International "Fugitive Snatching"
b. The Congressional View of Fugitive Snatching
While Congress has neither authorized nor forbidden fugitive snatching
in the FBI's general enabling acts, expression of legislative intent on the
subject in other statutes may indicate whether Congress would support
an interpretation of the acts as authorizing such conduct. Congress
passed two criminal statutes in the 1980s explicitly conferring extraterri-
torial jurisdiction on U.S. courts for crimes committed against Ameri-
cans and crimes significantly affecting the interests of the U.S.
Government: the 1984 Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Hostage Taking23 3 and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986.234 By declaring that certain crimes commit-
ted in foreign countries are prosecutable in the United States, both stat-
utes authorize federal law enforcement activities overseas. 23 5 It is
significant that both statutes have been formally construed by the FBI as
requiring the agency to obtain the cooperation and consent of the coun-
try in which such law enforcement activities are to be undertaken, even
though neither statute expressly requires such consent by its terms. 2 3 6
The legislative reports accompanying the two statutes do not shed light
on the Congressional opinion of fugitive snatching. Although such
reports are normally considered the most authoritative indicators of leg-
islative intent, Congress included the 1984 Act for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking within an omnibus crime
bill without any report language on the specific hostage taking provi-
sion. 23 7 And while the House Report accompanying the Omnibus Dip-
lomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 did describe the
extraterritorial jurisdiction provision generally, it said nothing about its
implications for law enforcement generally or fugitive snatching
specifically. 23 8
The fugitive snatching issue loomed large, however, in the hearings
and floor debates on the Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism bill.2 39
The bill, S. 1373, which eventually became the extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion provision in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism
233. P.L. 98-473 § 2001 (1984), 98 Stat. 2186 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1203).
234. P.L. 99-399 § 1202 (1986), 100 Stat. 896 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331).
235. Hearing Transcript, supra note 95, at 34 (testimony of Oliver B. Revell).
236. Id. at 35.
237. See H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. REP. Nos. 634, 1159,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See also 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEws 3182
(listing ten related reports).
238. H.R. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 1926, 1960-61.
239. See Bills to Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S. Government
Employees And Citizens Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism, Comm.
on theJudidary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 44-46, 63-65, 80-82 (1985) [hereinafter Ter-
rorism Hearing]. See also 132 CONG. REC. S8437-40 (daily ed. June 25, 1986).
The fugitive snatching issue was not raised in hearings on the 1984 Hostage Tak-
ing Act. See Terrorism Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm.
on theJudiciay, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See also Legislative Initiatives to Curb Domes-
tic And International Terrorism: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the
Senate Comm. on theJudidary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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Act of 1986, originally contained language conferring jurisdiction over
defendants "regardless of the manner in which the alleged offender was
brought before the court."' 240 This language is essentially a statutory
restatement of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. The fact that the language was
removed from the bill by the time it reached the Senate floor indicates
that at least some Senators did not want to lend legislative support to
the judicially created doctrine. 24 1
It is nevertheless hard to discern exactly what the legislative intent
was in removing the Ker-Frisbie language. The main sponsor of the bill,
Senator Specter, emphasized repeatedly during the floor debate that he
approved of non-consensual extraterritorial arrests. 24 2 Even though the
bill as passed did not explicitly authorize such arrests, Senator Specter
thought it should be read that way in light of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. 24 3
While this view of the legislation was expressly contradicted by Judge
Sofaer, the Legal Advisor to the State Department,24 4 and was criticized
on the Senate floor,24 5 the issue was never resolved explicitly, at least in
a public agreement or understanding. 24 6 The measure passed in an
unrecorded voice vote.2 4 7
That fugitive snatching was a major source of debate in the anti-
terrorism bill, but was left officially unresolved and went unmentioned
in the legislative reports, suggests a deliberate and negotiated decision
to maintain silence. Indeed, there was little reason to decide whether
the legislation authorized fugitive snatching. The Senators knew that if
a fugitive is brought before an American court in violation of interna-
tional law, the jurisdiction of the court is not impaired. 24 8 Senator
Specter and other supporters of fugitive snatching may have presumed
or been assured by the Administration that if Congress refrained from
explicitly authorizing fugitive snatching, the President could find it
within his authority to order it anyway. Thus it is impossible to discern a
definite "legislative intent" regarding fugitive snatching from the avail-
able information about Congress' recent consideration of bills authoriz-
ing extraterritorial law enforcement activities.
240. S. 1373, reprinted in Terrorism Hearing, supra note 239.
241. The language of the bill as it reached the Senate floor is found in 132 CoNG.
REc. S8437 (daily ed. June 25, 1986).
242. 132 CONG. REc. S8438, S8440 (daily ed. June 25, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Specter).
243. Id.
244. Terrorism Hearings, supra note 239, at 63.
245. 132 CONG. REC. S8439-40 (daily ed. June 25, 1986).
246. Such understandings are usually memorialized in committee, conference or
full House and Senate reports accompanying bills.
247. 132 CONG. REC. S8440 (daily ed. June 25, 1986).
248. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. S8440 (daily ed.June 25, 1986) (Statements by Sena-
tor Eagleton, acknowledging viability of Ker-Frisbie doctrine while arguing against
Senator Specter's contention that fugitive snatching was good policy for the U.S.).
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3. Scope of Executive Authority to Order Fugitive Snatching
The preceding two sub-sections establish that (1) the President and
Congress have general authority, under U.S. law, to violate customary
international law when acting within their respective constitutional
spheres, and (2) Congress has neither authorized nor forbidden the par-
ticular violation of international law contained in the act of fugitive
snatching. Returning to Justice Jackson's exegesis of Presidential power
in the Steel Seizure case, the fugitive snatching issue falls within the "zone
of twilight": that interstitial space between the powers of the President
and Congress, where the legislature has neither forbidden nor approved
an action and the President asserts a claim to undertake it on the basis of
his independent powers.24 9 In this context, the next sub-section exam-
ines the scope of the authority of the President and high officials to
order fugitive snatching.
a. President's Power to Order Fugitive Snatching
The President clearly has strong independent powers in foreign2 50 and
military affairs.2 5 ' The law enforcement power, incorporating powers of
prosecution and pardon, is also within the sphere of the President's
strongest independent powers. 25 2 In these areas, under separation of
powers doctrine, the President's powers are either completely his own
or concurrent with those of Congress. In turn, under the controlling
acts doctrine, the President is empowered to violate international law in
the absence of explicit congressional direction only when he acts within
his constitutional sphere. 25 3 Thus, when the President violates interna-
tional law, he is most likely to be acting precisely within one or all of the
areas-foreign affairs, defense, or law enforcement-where he can legit-
imately claim constitutional authority to violate international law. In
practical effect, under both separation of powers doctrine and the con-
trolling acts doctrine, the President can usually be found to be within his
authority in violating international law as long as Congress has not pro-
hibited the particular action.25 4
This principle applies easily to fugitive snatching. Whether the
President sends the FBI to abduct an indicted criminal or merely a sus-
pect, he exercises his powers as chief law enforcement officer. Because
the operation is extraterritorial, it falls within the vast realm of foreign
affairs, where the President is the "sole organ" of the United States.2 55
Further, in the increasingly common event that the military is involved
in the law enforcement operation, the President may also draw upon his
249. See 343 U.S. at 637.
250. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20
(1936).
251. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 191, at 54-56.
252. See L. TRIBE, supra note 201, at § 4-11.
253. See Henkin, supra note 170, at 882.
254. Cf L. HENKIN, supra note 191, at 209-10.
255. Curtiss-WMight, 299 U.S. 304, 319.
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powers as commander-in-chief of the nation's defense.2 56 In short, in
the absence of congressional prohibition, the President has clear author-
ity, under current law, to order fugitive snatching.
2 5 7
b. 1989 Opinion's Maximization of Presidential Power
In reaching the legally correct conclusion that the President has consti-
tutional authority to order fugitive snatching, the 1989 Opinion tended
to maximize the already considerable concentration of power in the
President with respect to law enforcement, foreign affairs, and defense.
First, the opinion relied on a broad and largely discredited conception
of the President's executive power as the basis of a broad power in for-
eign affairs. 258 Second, it implicitly rejected the principle that custom-
ary international law is integrated into the law of the United States.25 9
Third, it concluded that the controlling executive authority for fugitive
snatching need not come from the President himself, but may originate
at the Cabinet level or lower.2 60
(1). Executive Power as Basis of Foreign Affairs Power
The chief source of the President's power to order fugitive snatching,
according to Assistant Attorney General Barr's description of the 1989
Opinion, is the "intersection" of the President's "inherent constitu-
tional power to authorize law enforcement activities" with his power as
the "sole organ" in foreign affairs.2 6 ' While this appears to conflate two
distinct powers, it actually combines two long-standing doctrines by
which the President's executive authority justifies far larger powers in
foreign affairs than those enumerated in the text of the Constitution. 262
These two executive power doctrines are based on two separate provi-
sions of Article II of the Constitution. The first source is the grand
opening of the Article, vesting in the President the "executive power" of
the United States. 263 The second is the clause imposing on the Presi-
dent the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
26 4
These phrases have each hatched a theory to expand the foreign affairs
power.
The American author of the executive powers theory, Alexander
Hamilton, argued that the language of the Constitution and the concept
of executive power itself gave the President "congeries of independent,
major, substantive powers 'to determine the condition of the nation' in
its foreign relations." 265 James Madison, in the partisan fashion of the
256. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I.
257. Henkin, supra note 170, at 882.
258. See infra notes 261-75 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 282-96 and accompanying text.
261. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 8-10.
262. See J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, supra note 201, at § 6.2.
263. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
264. Id. at art. II, § 3.
265. L. HENKIN, supra note 191, at 42-43.
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day, immediately attacked this view as a monarchist import from Eng-
land.2 6 6 In perhaps the most authoritative modem articulation of the
scope of Presidential power, the Steel Seizure case, 26 7 Justice Jackson
sided with Madison over Hamilton, stating that the Executive Powers
clause was limited to the enumerated powers that followed it.26 8 To see
it as an open ended grant of all possible executive powers, as the Tru-
man Administration argued in the Steel Seizure case, smacked of the
"totalitarian" regimes of the day.2 69
The "take care" clause strand of the President's law enforcement/
foreign affairs power, also relied upon by Assistant Attorney General
Barr, originated in 1889 in In re Neagle.2 70 Despite the age and other
questionable features of the case, Barr relied on it heavily. In particular,
he cited the following passage, in which the Court asked rhetorically:
Is this duty [to take care that the laws be faithfully executed] limited to the
enforcement of acts of Congress or of treaties of the United States
according to their express terms, or does it include the rights, duties and
obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international rela-
tions, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government
under the Constitution? [Emphasis in original]2 71
Historically, this language has been used two ways. The first, that it
supports the President's authority unilaterally to enforce international
law, was not relied upon by Assistant Attorney General Barr and has no
application here. 27 2 The second, that it justifies "inherent" Presidential
powers not enumerated in the Constitution, was embraced by Barr. 273
As to this second usage, Professor Laurence Tribe states that it "has not
regained the vigor it knew at the turn of the century," but "the continu-
ing failure to develop a more consistent and less easily manipulated
approach to congressional silence creates the risk that the legislative
reins on executive authority will grow ever looser, especially when held
266. Id. at 43.
267. 343 U.S. 579 (Jackson, J., concurring).
268. Id. at 641.
269. Id. at 640-41.
270. L. HENKIN, supra note 191, at 55-56, 308 n.52.
271. In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64.
272. The reasons for Barr's avoidance of this usage are not as obvious as they may
seem. It has been used repeatedly by the President to justify unilateral foreign inter-
ventions on the grounds that they were necessary to "enforce" international law.
Thus, the doctrine could have served Barr well in justifying some extraterritorial
arrests but for the confusion it would have caused members of the Subcommittee
about which conception of "international law" was being enforced. According to
Professor Henkin, the argument that In Re Neagle justifies the use of Presidential
power unilaterally to "enforce" international law is
clever, but not compelling ... surely, authority to see that the laws shall be
executed means that the President shall enforce the law of the United States
(including international law and obligations that constitute United States law)
where American law applies, that is, within the United States or in regard to the
United States Government or its citizens ....
L. HENKIN, supra note 191, at 55 (emphasis added).
273. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 9.
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by a Court that seems eager to indulge presidential aggrandize-
ment." 274 Thus, according to Tribe, In Re Neagle is not only old but
dangerous because it encourages an unlimited exercise of executive
power. That danger is arguably very present in fugitive snatching,
where the President would be utilizing executive authority in the wake of
congressional silence in an area at the intersection of law enforcement,
foreign affairs, and defense, where courts have historically deferred to
the President.2 75 Neither Congress nor the Courts act in such an area as
an effective check on the President's power.
(2). The Weak Version of International Law
The second finding of the 1989 Opinion that tends to concentrate
power in the Executive is its implication that customary international law
is not integrated into the law of the United States without statutory
enactment.276 As a legal matter, this conclusion is simply erroneous. 2 77
The Paquete Habana,27 8 the very case relied upon by Barr to establish the
controlling executive act doctrine, establishes that customary interna-
tional law is equal in status to statutes and executive acts.27 9 Customary
international law need not be enacted to be binding because, like the
common law, it automatically became a part of the law of the United
States after American independence from Great Britain.28 0
It is unlikely that Barr intended to say that customary international
law is completely ineffective without statutory enactment, although with-
out the 1989 Opinion one cannot know for sure. At many points in their
Congressional testimony, Administration officials indicated that the FBI
and officials below the "highest levels" of the Executive Branch could
not order or execute fugitive snatching.28 1 This testimony indicates
that, in the Administration's view, international law operates as at least a
partial constraint on law enforcement activities.
(3). Authority of Executive Branch Officials Other Than the
President to Order Violation of International Law
The third finding of the 1989 Opinion that tends to concentrate power
in the Executive Branch is its apparent conclusion that a Presidential
order is not required for fugitive snatching.28 2 The authorization pro-
274. L. TRIBE, supra note 201, at § 4-8 n.27 and accompanying text.
275. Id.
276. See Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 10 ("[T]his [law enforce-
ment and foreign affairs] authority carries with it the power to direct Executive
Branch agents to carry out arrests that contravene customary international law and other
international law principles which our legislature has not acted upon to make part of our domestic
law.") (emphasis added).
277. See supra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
278. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
279. Id. at 700.
280. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
281. Hearing Transcript, supra note 95, at 35, 47-48 (testimony of Oliver B.
Revell); id. at 52, 60 (testimony of William P. Barr).
282. See Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 59-60.
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cedure that emerged from Assistant Attorney General Barr's congres-
sional testimony ultimately requires only the orders of the Attorney
General. 28 3 The plan for fugitive snatching would originate in "the
deputies committee" of the National Security Council.2 84 Before it
could be executed, the plan would be presented to the Attorney Gen-
eral, who could then order the FBI to carry it out.28 5 As a "matter of
policy," the President would probably be consulted; 28 6 however, as a
matter of law, neither his orders nor his advice are required.
28 7
The authority for the conclusion that a direct Presidential order is
not required "legally" to violate international law apparently came from
two sources, although one can only infer these sources from the strands
of Barr's testimony. First, In Re Neagle recognized that the Attorney
General has a delegated authority from the President to order any law
enforcement measure within the President's power.288 Second, a far
more recent precedent at the federal appellate level, Garcia-Mir v.
Meese, 28 9 recognized that the Attorney General may, on his own author-
ity, order the indefinite detention of Cuban refugees in violation of
international law. 290 One can infer from Barr's testimony that, in his
view, the two cases empower the Attorney General to order law enforce-
ment actions which violate international law. Scrutinizing that conclu-
sion in light of the cases shows that In Re Neagle is inapposite on its facts,
but Garcia-Mir is viable law applicable to fugitive snatching.
The issue in Neagle was whether the Attorney General had the
power, without explicit authorization from Congress or the President, to
assign U.S. Marshals to guard a Supreme Court Justice. 29 1 The author-
ity to violate international or domestic law was not an issue in the case.
In contrast to fugitive snatching, the authority needed to guard a
Supreme Court Justice did not have to be sufficiently strong to over-
come an existing legal constraint. Fugitive snatching, on the other
hand, violates a clear rule of international law which has been incorpo-
rated into U.S. law. It requires the exercise of independent legislative
powers because existing rules of law, composed of international law
incorporated into U.S. law, must be re-made. Not surprisingly, the
authority required to order fugitive snatching is thus greater than that
required to order guards for a Supreme CourtJustice. The legal princi-
ples in Neagle cannot be fairly applied to the fundamentally different
issues of fact and law involved in a fugitive snatching case.
Garcia-Mir, however, is the law, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, and,
according to Professor Louis Henkin, it has greatly increased the scope
283. Id. at 61.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 60-61.
286. Id. at 60.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 9-10, relying on 135 U.S. 1, 67-68.
289. 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
290. Id. at 1454-55.
291. 135 U.S. at 67-68.
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of executive branch authority to violate international law. 292 By holding
that the Attorney General may, on his own account, order the indefinite
detention of Cuban aliens in violation of international law, the court
removed the requirement that violations of international law be under-
taken only by an entity with constitutionally traceable legislative pow-
ers.29 3 Moreover, the court ignored the requirement of the controlling
executive act doctrine that the action be within the constitutional power
of the President.2 94 Immigration is not an area where the President may
exercise independent law-making powers, according to Professor Hen-
kin.29 5 Afortiori, the Attorney General cannot exercise such powers in
an area not within the President's authority.
Notwithstanding the flaws of Garcia-Mir, it controls the question of
fugitive snatching in one of the circuits where it is likely to be an
issue. 296 Professor Henkin's criticism that the case extends the control-
ling executive act doctrine beyond the constitutional limits of Presiden-
tial power will not help an abducted defendant. Fugitive snatching is at
the confluence of core Presidential powers-law enforcement, defense,
and foreign affairs. Even if Garcia-Mir incorrectly articulated the Attor-
ney General's power to violate international law regarding immigration,
the controlling executive act doctrine as cryptically announced in The
Paquete Habana and understood by experts would support the Presi-
dent's power to order fugitive snatching. Garcia-Mir simply expands this
doctrine by holding that the Attorney General may order violations of
international law, such as fugitive snatching, without authorization from
the President.
C. Policy Implications of the 1989 Opinion
The 1989 Opinion fits squarely within a tradition of presidential power
maximization. Assistant Attorney General Barr utilized the old execu-
tive powers doctrines to inflate the President's freedom of action in for-
eign affairs. By emphasizing the weakness of international law, he
highlighted the power of the executive to override it. If international
law is not really a part of U.S. law, then lower officials are capable of
"controlling executive acts" that supersede it so long as they stay within
broadly defined spheres of executive action.
1. Concentration of Foreign Affairs and Defense Powers in the President
There is little in the specific terms of Article II of the Constitution sup-
porting the President's considerable powers in foreign affairs and
defense. The powers the President has acquired in these areas over the
last two hundred years, by practice and by judicial construction, have
292. Henkin, supra note 170, at 883-85.
293. Id. at 884-85, nn.133-34 and accompanying text.
294. Id. at 884 n. 30 and accompanying text.
295. Id.
296. The Eleventh Circuit, covering the states of Georgia, Florida and Alabama,
hears many drug cases.
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been inferred from the language of the Constitution. Theories relying
upon the general executive power and "take care" clauses to find almost
unlimited foreign affairs powers are notorious examples of this loose
construction. 297
The 1989 Opinion reflects a current tendency to fuse the Presi-
dent's existing powers in foreign affairs, defense and law enforcement
into a new, all-encompassing "external affairs" power. In his congres-
sional testimony, Assistant Attorney General Barr justified construing
the FBI's vague enabling acts to authorize the violation of international
law by citing a general power in external affairs. 29 8 The 1989 invasion
of Panama similarly revealed a tendency to combine the President's
independent powers, creating one great external affairs power. The oft-
cited four goals of the invasion were a fascinating mix: "to protect
American lives, support democracy, bring the fugitive Manuel Noriega
to justice, and protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties." 29 9
The first looks like commander-in-chief, the second and fourth like "sole
organ" in foreign affairs, and the third like chief law enforcement officer.
Throughout the nation's history, Congress and the President have
struggled for control of foreign affairs and defense. The Constitution
explicitly grants these powers to both branches. While the President is
commander-in-chief,3 0 0 only Congress can declare war.30 1 The Presi-
dent proposes weapons programs, but Congress decides whether to pay
for them.3 0 2 The President negotiates treaties, but the Senate must rat-
ify them.30 3 In law enforcement, however, the President's indepen-
dence inheres in the concept of the rule of law. The legislature makes
laws and therefore should not execute them. Congress cannot interfere
in the particulars of law enforcement. Thus, when the President utilizes
his law enforcement power to justify foreign intervention and military
action, he has removed himself as far as possible from congressional
scrutiny. The infusion of foreign military acts with a law enforcement
justification protects the President's freedom of action to the greatest
extent possible.
297. See U.S. CON T. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. at § 3.
298. Barr quoted Justice Jackson's concurrence in the Steel Seizure case: "I should
indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to [the President's] exclusive function to
command the instruments of national force, at least when turned against the outside
world for the security of our society." 343 U.S. at 645. In making that statement,
JusticeJackson was referring specifically to the President's powers as commander-in-
chief, and he followed the statement with a passionate argument for limiting those
powers by maintaining the separation of the President's military and civilian roles.
Id. at 645-46.
299. Letter from President Bush to The Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Dec. 21, 1989).
300. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
301. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
302. See id. at art. II § 3; art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
303. Id. at art.II, § 2, cl. 2.
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In 1878, in the Posse Comitatus Act,3 0 4 Congress addressed the
danger that the President might combine his power as chief law enforce-
ment officer with his power as commander-in-chief. The statute forbids
the use of the military for general law enforcement purposes without
express authorization from Congress or reliance on a provision of the
Constitution.3 0 5 Because the President ordered Noriega and other fugi-
tives arrested "in the course of carrying out the military operation in
Panama,"3 0 6 the Posse Comitatus Act was not violated. The use of the
military for law enforcement purposes in this instance was subsumed
within the President's role as commander-in-chief of the nation's
defense. Still, the principle behind the statute and the facts of the Pan-
ama invasion seem to clash. The statute stands for the principle that
Congress should control the use of the military, and the President
should not be allowed to use his general law enforcement powers to
deploy it without constraint. The Panama invasion, carried off with
barely a peep from Capitol Hill, showed that the President could unilat-
erally order the largest military operation (at that time) since the Viet-
nam War and justify it by saying, among other things, that it was
necessary to bring a fugitive to justice.
2. Changing the Rules of the Game
The final proposition of Assistant Attorney General Barr's congressional
testimony was that the President has the authority, under his constitu-
tional foreign affairs power, to participate in the process of making cus-
tomary international law by violating it.30 7 This principle was also
reflected in the testimony of the State Department's Legal Advisor,
Judge Abraham Sofaer. Judge Sofaer argued that political terrorism in
the 1980s, and the need to respond to it, were changing the concept of
justified self-defense under international law.30 8 The U.S. attack on
Libya in 1986, for example, was viewed by many nations at the time as
an infraction of international law, but it has been increasingly accepted
since then as an act of self-defense, according to Judge Sofaer.30 9
While Judge Sofaer seemed more comfortable with justifications
that operated within the boundaries of the international legal system,
Assistant Attorney General Barr took a more aggressive approach. Fugi-
tive snatching was justified to bring to trial "a terrorist ... basking in
some safe haven, enjoying the payoff that he received for blowing Amer-
icans out of the sky. ' ' 3 10 The kind of "moral equivalence" contained in
304. Posse Comitatus Act, 20 STAT. 152 (1878) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1385, as
amended Pub. L. No. 86-70 (1959)).
305. Id.
306. Memorandum from President Bush to the Secretary of Defense, (Dec. 20,
1989) (released by White House Press Office).
307. Statement of William P. Barr, supra note 19, at 11-12.
308. Statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 11.
309. Id.
310. Hearing Transcript, supra note 95, at 43 (testimony of William P. Barr).
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international law rules of reciprocity did not appeal to him.3 1 1 Fugitive
snatching by the United States, as opposed to Iran, for example, is good
because "the purpose of law ultimately is to protect innocent people
from predators. And the people we're fighting are ruthless
predators."3 12 Thus, fugitive snatching will become an accepted prac-
tice under international law, in this view, when the world recognizes that
it is necessary in order to achieve substantive justice for injured innocent
parties.
3. Opposite Ends of the Eighties
The final proposition of the 1980 Opinion was that the United States, in
the international climate of the day, could "ill afford" to be seen as an
international law-breaker.3 13 The statement may be an oblique refer-
ence to the overriding contemporary importance of bringing interna-
tional pressure to bear on the government of Iran for its role in taking
and holding American hostages at the U.S. Embassy. The United States
could not label Iran an international outlaw if it acted like one itself by
abducting Robert Vesco from the Bahamas.
The view in 1990 is much different. The decade has seen acts of
terrorism against U.S. citizens that have undoubtedly traumatized the
American public. Some involved mass bloodshed, like the bombing of
the Marine barracks and U.S. embassy in Beirut, the Rome airport
attack, and the obliteration of Pan Am Flight 103. Others, equally as
shocking, have involved only a few victims, such as the shootings of
Leon Klinghoffer and Navy diver Charles Stetham. To many people,
including some in the Justice Department, it may not appear reasonable
in 1990 to be constrained by international law in the effort to bring
those responsible for such acts to justice.
Given the different purposes and contexts of the two opinions, their
different legal conclusions are not surprising. Simply put, kidnapping
Robert Vesco hardly seemed worth the trouble it would have caused the
United States internationally in the political climate of 1980. The 1989
Opinion clearly had a different kind of target in mind. Congressional
testimony by Administration officials repeatedly emphasized threats
posed by narcotics traffickers and political terrorists. Against those
kinds of targets, fugitive snatching may seem worth the risks.
Conclusion
Ordering the abduction of fugitives is a violation of international law
that, nonetheless, clearly falls within the President's authority under
domestic law.3 14 There is no constitutional bar on the power of Con-
gress or the President to authorize extraterritorial actions that violate
311. Id. at50.
312. Id. at 51.
313. 1980 Opinion, supra note 13, at 556.
314. See Henkin, supra note 170, at 882.
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international law. But when violating international law, Congress and
the President should be bound by the limits the Constitution imposes on
them generally. The executive authority to violate international law
should extend no further than the President's constitutional powers, and
it should not be extended to lower executive officials who lack an
independent constitutional basis for their authority.
There are limits, however, to how far the law will constrain Presi-
dential power. The President's powers in law enforcement, military
matters, and foreign affairs are likely to support, legally, nearly any vio-
lation of international law that the President might undertake. The
absence of political control by Congress, or a rights-based control by the
courts,3 15 leaves the President with virtually unlimited power to act
beyond U.S. borders.
Theodore C. Jonas
315. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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